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Appearance-reality (AR) distinction understanding in preschoolers is worth of further consideration. This also goes for its
relationship with false-belief (FB) understanding. This study helped fill these gaps by assessing 3-, 4-, and 5-year-old children’s
performances on an appearance-reality distinction task and by investigating relationships with unexpected location, deceptive
content, and deception comprehension task performances. 91 preschoolers participated in this study divided into 3 groups: (1) 37
children, M-age 3.4 years; (2) 23 children, M-age 4.5 years; (3) 31 children, M-age 5.4 years. A developmental trend was found
where appearance-reality distinction understanding was significantly influenced by age. If wrong answers were particularly high by
3-year-old children, they greatly decreased by 4- and 5-year-old children. 3-year-old children also tended to fail in FB tasks; instead
4- and 5-year-old children performed AR tasks better than FB tasks. Theoretical and practical implications were discussed.
1. Theory of Mind: A Complex Construct
Since Premack andWoodruff [1], “theory ofmind” (ToM) has
been one of themajor fields of research in child development.
Recognized as a multifaceted sociocognitive process [2], it
shows a deep involvement with both cognitive and social
functioning [3, 4]. Children’s ToM defines both awareness of
their own mental states (i.e., thought, decision, knowledge,
and belief) and the fact that people may have different
representations of the world and act on the basis of them
[1]. So, this ability allows one to explain and predict people’s
behavior [5–7]. The key aspects of ToM are that children
recognize other people as psychological beings [8] and
distinguish internal from external world [9].The construct of
ToM comprises different components: from young children’s
ability to speak of their own and others’ mental states and
to lie [10], to the preschoolers’ use of language of mind
[11] and ability to comprehend false beliefs [12, 13], and
to appearance-reality distinction [14–16]. With this study,
we explored appearance-reality distinction understanding in
preschoolers and investigated relationships with false-belief
understanding.
2. Appearance-Reality Distinction and
False Beliefs
Researchers interested in studying ToM in preschoolers focus
on the ability to understand that people will act in accordance
with their beliefs about reality, even if those beliefs are false
[17] and do so, especially, using false-belief tasks, like the
unexpected location [18] and deceptive contents [16, 19].
In a typical unexpected location task children are shown a
scenario in which a story character places a desirable object
(such as a candy or a ball) in a particular location before
leaving the scene [18]. Then, another character transfers the
object to a different location.The child is then asked to predict
where the first character will look for his/her object when
he/she comes back. To attribute a different representation
of reality to the first character that will influence his/her
behavior meansmastering a false belief through the recursive
process “I think that you think.” The deceptive content
(called also “Smarties”) task included two direct questions to
investigate both the child’s false belief and the others' false
belief [19]. The procedure includes using a Smarties tube
filled with crayons. The researcher first asked the child what
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he/she thoughtwas in there and generally the child responded
by saying Smarties, candies, or similar. At this point, the
researcher showed that the true content was crayons and then
put the crayons back into the tube. The child is asked two
questions to investigate his/her own “What did you first think
was inside the tube?” and the others false belief “What will
your friend think is inside the tube?”
A less investigated component of ToM in preschool
children is the appearance-reality distinction such as under-
standing that mental states can differ from reality states [6,
14].This latest concept highlights the fact that theory of mind
also means being aware of the fact that our mental world
could differ from the physical one and actively try to interpret
and reason for the causes and consequences of those possible
differences [21]. An experimental paradigm to investigate
children’s appearance-reality understanding was introduced
and developed by Flavell et al. [14]. In this experiment,
the researcher shows the participant a sponge that looks
like a stone. Then, the researcher asks the participant if
the object looks like a stone or a sponge and whether the
same object is actually a stone or a sponge. The correct
answers presuppose the ability to distinguish the appearance
(as a representation believed to be true) from the exact
representation of reality. At the same time, it implies the
ability to handle the simultaneous presence of two different
representations of the same object. Before reaching this
awareness, children tend to believe that their perceptions
of the world are accurate reflections of its actual properties
and that others will therefore perceive the world as they
do, so they are egocentrically biased [22]. Children who
understand the distinction between appearance and reality
have an awareness of the real nature of the object; they
distinguish their representation of reality from that held by
others, and they predict that others could be deceived by it.




What Types of Relationships?
Extensive research has identified an interesting period for
ToM ability improvements between 3 and 5 years [14, 23].
Despite the recognized existence of significant individual
differences [24, 25], cultural variations and task manipula-
tions, and the earliest understanding of their own false belief
than that of the other [26], a wide-ranging improvement in
preschool age leads to support the idea that an important con-
ceptual change occurs in this period [27]. Evidence in litera-
ture (see, [28, 29]) shows a similar pattern of development of
false-belief and appearance-reality distinction understanding
with significant correlations emerging between them. This
finding is not surprising because both of them involve the
same ability to recognize and cognitively manage conflicting
representations [16]. Regarding false-belief understanding,
most preschoolers fail at age 3 but subsequently grasp the
correct answers at around age 5. However, the introduction
of changes in the typical procedures of standard tests leads
to increased performances of children under the age of 4; for
example, the children’s performance improves when they are
actively involved [30, 31]. Both for FB tasks and AR tasks, 3-
and 4-year-old children rarely distinguish between the way
in which an object appears and the way in which it truly is
[32]. Failing to pay attention to the two representations of
the object (appearance and reality), they refer only to one of
them.Therefore, a tendency to “phenomenism pattern error”
is found when participants pay attention only to appearance.
Instead, a tendency to “intellectual realism pattern error”
occurs when they focus exclusively on the real characteristics
of the object, regardless of how it looks [14].Thekindof think-
ing found in children of this age recalls the “irreversibility”
described by [33], as part of the “preoperative stage.” At 3
years old children produce fewer correct answers and mostly
realist errors; then at 4 years, errors range from 40% to 60%,
mostly of the realist type [34]. Instead, the ability to recognize
and distinguish appearance from reality seemsmastered by 5-
year-old children [16]. At this age, they quite clearly recall the
reversibility of thought, and they are able to simultaneously
perform more mental representations and integrate them as
a whole, having in mind which are true and which are false.
Findings in literature show that the period between the ages
of 3 and 5 is significant, because children are constructing
a new conceptual awareness that their mind and world
are separate, and furthermore, the mind may misrepresent
the true state of the world [15, 35]. In appearance-reality
distinction the child has to be able to say “this looks like. . .but
really is. . .” similar to the ability to understand other people’s
false belief for which they should be able to say “he/she
thinks this is. . .but I think this is. . ..” As reported by Gopnik
and Astington [16], interesting relationships between FB and
AR understanding emerge: (1) both tasks require one to
consider two conflicting representations; (2) both seem to
develop between 3 and 5 years; and (3) both are correlated.
Even if researchers find a similar pattern of development and
significant relationships between false-belief and appearance-
reality tasks, literature (see [29, 36]) also highlights devel-
opmental lags. In particular, two developmental patterns
emerge [29]: (1) AR tasks are performed with more success
than FB tasks (75% of children); (2) FB tasks are performed
more easily than AR tasks (25% of children). These findings
lead to questioning their meaning. One contribution in this
direction is advanced by Melot and Angeard [37]. In their
training study, they find a symmetrical transfer from FB to
AR and from AR to FB that supports interdependence of the
two constructs and isomorphy of the metarepresentational
process they call into play.They trained preschool children in
theory of mind tasks: two experimental groups were created:
one trained in false-belief understanding and the other in
the appearance-reality distinction. Children belonging to
experimental groups were evaluated on appearance-reality
and false-belief tasks and given explanations and feedback
on their performance during two training sessions. Children
belonging to the control group also were evaluated on false-
belief and appearance-reality tests, but they received no
feedback. At posttest, children in the control group showed
no improvement suggesting that explanations and feedback
are necessary for improvement. Instead, the two experimental
groups showed a direct effect on the trained task (false-belief
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or appearance-reality task) but also a transfer effect of the
benefits of the training on the task that was not being
trained (i.e., on the appearance-reality test in the false-belief
group) highlighting the interdependency between these two
concepts.
4. Rationale for This Study
Literature highlights the onset of theory of mind (ToM) in
preschool time [38]. For this reason, we decided to conduct
this study focusing on that interesting period. However, two
important points should be underlined: firstly, even though
this last aspect of the theory of mind construct has been
widely investigated, AR distinction understanding remains in
the background. Secondly, the debate is still open about the
relationship between AR distinction and FB understanding.
Our study moved from those two key points and aimed
firstly to investigate how successes and failures change in 3-
, 4-, and 5-year-old children’s performances in AR task and
secondly to investigate their relationships with performances
on unexpected location, deceptive content, and deception
comprehension tasks. In addition, we used a set of FB tasks
that allow us to highlight differences in performance through
the use of puppets and pictures (see “Sally andAnn” task) and
differences in performance comparing one’s own and others’
false-belief understanding (see “Smarties” task) and how they
relate to the understanding of AR distinction.
5. Research Questions and Hypotheses
This study aims to
(1) evaluate the performance of 3-, 4-, and 5-year-old
children in an appearance-reality task;
(2) investigate relationships between results to the ap-
pearance-reality task (Task 1) and those obtained in
the following tasks:
(i) unexpected location, “Sally and Ann” with pup-
pets false-belief task (Task 2a);
(ii) unexpected location, “Sally and Ann” with pic-
tures false-belief task (Task 2b);
(iii) deceptive contents, comprehension of our own
false belief via the “Smarties task” (Task 3a);
(iv) deceptive contents, comprehension of others’
false beliefs via the “Smarties task” (Task 3b);
(v) deception comprehension task (Task 4).
Regarding the first aim, we expected significantly low
comprehension of the distinction between appearance and
reality for 3-year-old children and better performance for 5-
year-old children, with 4-year-old children improving signif-
icantly.
Regarding the second aim, in line with literature [29,
36] we expected an improvement between 3 and 5 years to
cross all the tests, with a higher proportion of children that
better comprehend AR distinction than FB. Furthermore,
in line with literature [30, 31], we assumed that the use of
puppets in false-belief task (task 2a) could facilitate a greater
understanding and better performance thanks to their capac-
ity to stimulate interest in children. So, we predicted that
performance on the “Sally Ann” with puppets false-belief
task (task 2a) [25] would yield better performance than those
obtained using the pictures (task 2b), especially for younger
children, for whom the understanding of the situation in the
picturesmay bemore complex than its staging using puppets.
6. Method
6.1. Participants. Ninety-one children (48 females and 43
males, age range = 3–5 years; SD = .87) were randomly
selected from a preschool located in the suburbs of a large
city of central Italy. Children were 3 (𝑁 = 37, M-age = 3.4
years), 4 (𝑁 = 23, M-age 4.5 years), or 5 years old (𝑁 = 31,
M-age 5.4 years).
Childrenwith certified disabilitieswere not included. Par-
ents and school authorities, as well as the children themselves,
gave consent to participate in the study. According to school
officials, the socioeconomic level of the participants ranged
from lower-middle class (85%) to upper-middle class (15%).
The socioeconomic level was documented on the basis of
their parents’ qualifications and employment.
This research was endorsed by the Departmental Ethics
Committee, Department of Education and Psychology, Uni-
versity of Florence. The authorities also gave consent to
participate in the study.
6.2. Procedure, Measures, and Coding System. The following
tasks were individually administered to the children in a quiet
space in the school, but outside the classroom.
6.3. Task 1: Appearance-Reality (AR) Task [14]. To assess
the participants’ ability to distinguish the difference between
appearance and reality, the appearance-reality task was used
[14]. In a preliminary session prior to the examination with
other children, we observed that children rapidly learn how
to respond to this kind of test, so we prefer to use a single
measure of AR.
In AR task the color of an object changes by means of a
colored filter. In the test administered for this research a red
glass containing milk was used. The glass of milk was placed
on a table so that the participant could see the contents but
could not look inside.The experimenter showed each subject
the glass saying that it contained milk.
Then, (s)he posed the following question: “Tell me, what
color is the milk in this glass?” The answer may be “the milk
is white, but in this glass, it appears red” or something similar.
If the participant answered the first question saying “red,” the
researcher asked the control question: “Truly, what color is
the milk?”
If the participant answered the first question saying
“white,” the researcher asked the control question: “What
color do you see the milk in this glass?”
All responseswere recorded, transcribed, and then coded.
Answers were coded as follows.
(i) A score of 0 was assigned when the participant did
not recognize the difference between appearance and
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reality, that is, when they gave wrong answers to both
questions “red-red” or “white-white.”
(ii) A score of 1 was assigned when (a) the participant
responded “red” to the first question and “white” to
the second; (b) the participant responded “white” to
the first question and “red” to the second, showing
that, despite the perceptual salience of the appearance,
the participant managed to keep in mind also the
real representation; (c) the participant clearly retells
his/her understanding of the difference between
appearance and reality with expressions like “. . . it
looks red because it is inside the red glass, but themilk
is white.”
Interrater reliability was good (Cohen’s k = .96).
6.4. Task 2a: Task of False-Belief “Sally and Ann” Presented
with Puppets [39]. For this false-belief task puppets were
used to play the experimental situation of “Sally and Ann.”
Characters were represented with two puppets named Maria
and Francesco. The experimenter told the participant that
Maria wanted to go for a walk and before leaving she put
a ball in a colored box. Maria was then moved under the
table so as to make her absence and inability to see what
would happen clear. Another puppet, Francesco, takes the
ball from the box and puts it in the trash. Finally, Maria
returns and the participant is asked the false belief, “Where
will Maria look for the ball?” The experimenter then asked
the participant, “Well, why doesn’t Maria look in the. . .
why wouldn’t Maria look there?” This additional question
helped clarify the participant’s understanding of false belief.
Responses were recorded, transcribed, and then coded.
Answers were coded as follows.
(i) A score of 0 was assigned when the participant had
not recognized the false belief.
(ii) A score of 1 was assigned when the participant had
demonstrated that they understood the false belief,
either by giving the correct answer, or by giving an
exact motivation despite a wrong answer.
Interrater reliability was good (Cohen’s 𝑘 = .98).
6.5. Task 2b: Test of False-Belief “Sally and Ann” Presented
with Pictures [39]. For this false-belief task pictures were
used to deliver the “Sally and Ann” story. This picture
variant helps determine whether this different presentation is
more/less cognitively complex than the first puppet variant.
Participants were presented with pictures and were read the
accompanying text, which told a parallel story to the one
previously presented.The test ended by asking the participant
the false-belief question, “WherewillMaria look for her ball?”
as well as answering the motivation question, “Well, why
doesn’t Maria look in the. . . why wouldn’t Maria look there?”
Responses were recorded, transcribed, and then coded.
Answers were coded as follows.
(i) A score of 0 was assigned when the participant had
not recognized the false belief.
(ii) A score of 1 was assigned when the participant had
demonstrated that they understood the false belief,
either by giving the correct answer or by giving an
exact motivation despite a wrong answer.
Interrater reliability was good (Cohen’s 𝑘 = .98).
6.6. Tasks 3a and 3b: Test of “Unexpected Content” or “Smar-
ties Test” [4, 40]—Comprehension of Our Own and Others’
False Beliefs. The “Smarties test” was used to evaluate the
participants’ ability to understand their own and others’ false
beliefs.The task was administered using a commonplace tube
of candy that actually contained pencils. The experimenter
showed the closed tube of candies to the participant and
questioned him/her about its contents. After the participant
had said that the tube contained candies, the experimenter
asked the participant to open the tube in order to check
its contents. Once the participant discovered that the tube
contained pencils, the investigator explained, “I finished the
candies, so I used it for pencils,” and then two questions were
asked, the first was about someone else's false belief while the
secondwas about their own false belief.The first questionwas
“If we now call another child, we show them the box and ask
them what’s in it, what would they say is inside the box?”The
second questionwas “Beforewe opened the box, what did you
think was in there?” Responses were recorded, transcribed,
and then coded.
Answers were coded as follows.
(i) A score of 0 was assigned when the participant had
not recognized the false belief.
(ii) A score of 1 was assigned when the participant
demonstrated that they understood the false belief,
either by giving the correct answer, or by giving an
exact motivation despite a wrong answer.
Interrater reliability was good (Cohen’s k = .96).
6.7. Task 4: Deception Comprehension Task [8]. To under-
stand each participant’s comprehension of deception, child
listened to a story and then (s)he retold it. In the story a
situation of deception is told that is an indicator of theory of
mind. The stories are also used to evaluate the participants
who were asked to retell them.
The story was as follows.
Animal Story
Once upon a time, in a wheat field, a little sparrow
was greedily pecking ripe wheat grains. A cat,
attracted by the rustle of the bird’s wings, came up
silently to the bird and pow! In one moment with
his paw he grabbed the little sparrow’s tail. The cat
was about to eat the little sparrow when it said:
“Hey, hey! A real gentleman never begins to eat
if he is not clean!” The cat let the little sparrow
go and cleaned his muzzle with his paws. Then
the clever little sparrow frr. . . frr. . . flew away
immediately. So the cat understood he had been
tricked and in his heart he swore not to be tricked
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Table 1: Story structure coding [20].
Level Definition Score
No telling 0
First level: nonstory Simple description of actions without characteristics of narrative style 1
Second level: sketch story Characteristics of narrative style, such as introduction of the setting and 2
the main characters, are present, but both problem and resolution are missing
Third level: incomplete story Elementary narrative structure without a central event 3
Fourth level: essential story Nonessential structural elements are missing 4
Fifth level: complete story All eight elements are present; only the title is considered optional 5




states that might influence our
behavior (such as hunger or
thirst)
Being hungry, eating, drinking,
being born, being ill
Perceptual state (P) Terms describing what and howwe perceive the world
Watching, listening, smelling,




Terms describing our positive
feelings and emotions
Happy, pretty, nice, kiss, caressing,
cuddle, hug, like, caring
Negative emotions state
(EN)
Terms describing our negative
feelings and emotions
Sad, angry, annoyed, ugly, scared,
crying, screaming, getting bored,
worrying, complaining
Willingness state (V) Terms describing what we wantto achieve and do
Willing, can, hoping, achieving,
letting, trying, looking for, ordering
Cognitive state (C) Terms representing what wecognitively think
Knowing, thinking, understanding,
remembering, forgetting, clever,
paying attention, true, false
Moral state (M) Terms representing our moralperspective
Good, having to, reprimanding,
promising, giving thanks,
recommending, obeying
Sociorelational state (SR) Terms describing therelationships between characters
Joking, helping, alone, becoming
friends, abandoning, tricking
again. So, since that day, cats always clean their
muzzle after their meal and not before!
All the stories retold by children were recorded and
transcribed for analysis.
Answers were coded as follows.
To evaluate the deception comprehension, we referred to
[8]; see also Table 2. The children’s narratives were assessed
by two independent judges, assigning a dichotomous score.
(i) A score of 0 was assigned when there was no
comprehension of deception: it was assigned when
the sequence of historical events that lead to the
situation of deception was not exposed properly and
that is evident when the language of mind is not
used properly or is used in a manner not relevant to
deception.
(ii) A score of 1 was assigned in the presence of the
correct exposure sequence of events that make up the
situation of deception accompanied by an appropriate
mental language explaining the comprehension of
deception and including other references to false
belief.
Interrater reliability was good (Cohen’s k = .95).
6.8. Narrative Competence. Children’s narrative competence
strongly associated with ToM [41] was tested as a similar
indicator to linguistic and verbal skills. Stories were evaluated
in terms of structure, cohesion, and coherence in producing
stories.
To analyze story structure, we used [42]. The presence,
absence, and/or combinations of the eight fundamental
elements (title, conventionalized story opening, characters,
setting, problem, central event, resolution, and convention-
alized story closing) allowed for rating of the stories into five
categories, indicating varying levels of structural complexity,
as shown in Table 1. Agreements between the judges (which
was measured with Cohen’s kappa, 𝑘 = .98) were good. To
analyze levels of cohesion in stories, the categories proposed
byHalliday andHasan [43] were used in order to detect cohe-
sion among the elements of the story (e.g., the, thus, because,
so, for, that, and consequently) and temporal cohesiveness,
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Table 3: Statistical association between different comprehension of appearance-reality tasks and the age of the participants: Chi-square test.
Task Comprehension 3 years 4 years 5 years Chi-square
Appearance-reality(1) Absent 18 (5.5) 1 (−1.8) 0 (−3.9) 29.56∗∗∗
Present 13 (−5.5) 13 (1.8) 27 (3.9)
False-belief task with puppets Absent 26 (3.8) 11 (−.5) 11 (−3.3) 15.90∗∗∗
Present 4 (−3.8) 9 (.5) 19 (3.3)
False-belief task with pictures Absent 22 (2.8) 13 (.7) 8 (−3.5) 13.41∗∗
Present 7 (−2.8) 8 (−.7) 20 (3.5)
Smarties test 1 Absent 20 (3.3) 8 (−.2) 5 (−3.2) 13.20∗∗
Present 11 (−3.3) 12 (.2) 23 (3.2)
Smarties test 2 Absent 23 (4.9) 6 (−1.1) 3 (−4.0) 25.83∗∗∗
Present 8 (−4.9) 14 (1.1) 25 (4.0)
Note. Frequencies and residuals in bold are significant. Standardized adjusted residuals are in brackets. (1) Fisher Exact Test was used instead of Chi-square
test. ∗∗𝑝 < .01 and ∗∗∗𝑝 < .001.
indicating a chronological sequence in the story (e.g., once
upon a time, when, never, before, at the end, and suddenly).
The amount of cohesiveness used by the participants, in
proportion to the number of words produced, led to four
increasing levels of cohesion: absent, low, medium, and high,
corresponding to scores ranging from 0 to 3. Interrater
agreementwas good (Cohen’s k= .98). Finally, to assess global
story coherence, the sentences in the retold and transcribed
stories were identified and their agreement was detected [44].
The amount of incoherence, proportional to the total number
of sentences, produced four score categories (ranging from
0 to 3), indicating growing levels of coherence (absent, low,
medium, and high). Interrater agreement reliability was good
(Cohen’s k = .95).
7. Data Analyses
Given the reduced variability of the scores, distribution
frequencies were considered on a nominal dichotomic scale.
In relation to the first aim we verified the developmental
trend for the performances obtained on all the tasks through
the construction of contingency tables which were created
with two entries: “test” and “age.” Chi-square tests were
used to analyze differences and Fisher’s Exact Test was used
whenever the Chi-square was inappropriate. Furthermore,
several Fisher’s Exact Tests were performed to investigate
the comprehension of the false belief in the different tasks
for each age group. Several comparisons were made on the
standardized adjusted residuals calculated in order to better
understand the relationship between the variables. Regarding
the second aim, adjusted standardized residuals of different
contingency tables were carried out.
8. Results
To summarize the data on developmental trend and to
introduce those on the comparison between tests, Table 1
reports the results obtained in each test for all three age
groups considered.
Regarding the first aim, Table 1 results demonstrate
a significant difference between appearance and reality
[Fisher’s Exact Test = 29.56, p < .001]. Standardized adjusted
residuals show a significant increase of comprehension for
the appearance/reality task for 5-year-old children (presence:
std. residual = 3.9) than for 3-year-old children (present: std.
residual = −5.5) (Table 3).
Results demonstrate significant differences between the
age groups; in fact, “false-belief task with puppets” [𝜒2 (2) =
15.90, p< .001], “false-belief task with pictures” [𝜒2 (2) = 13.41,
p< .01], “Smarties test 1” [𝜒2 (2) = 13.20, p< .01], and “Smarties
test 2” [𝜒2 (2) = 25.83, p < .001] show significantly different
distributions of their scores in the three ages. Regarding
all the false-belief tasks, the standardized adjusted residuals
show a constant increase of the comprehension of the false
belief as the age increases, with lack of comprehension being
more at 3 years and a more frequent presence of compre-
hension at 5 years (Table 3). Unlike the appearance/reality
task, the analysis of the standardized residuals shows that the
difference in the comprehension of the false-belief tasks is
between the 3- and the 5-year old children.
Concerning the comparison between the comprehension
of the appearance-reality concept in the different tasks
separately for each class of age (3 years old vs. 4 years old
vs. 5 years old), for the 3-year-old children, comprehension
performance of the tasks did not differ [Fisher’s Exact Test =
7.28, p = n.s.] (Table 4), while for 4- and 5-year-old children,
the comprehension of the appearance-reality task was more
present than the comprehension for all the others tasks,
respectively [Fisher’s Exact Test = 13.46, p < .01], and [Fisher’s
Exact Test = 16.45, p < .01] in particular for false-belief task
with puppets (Table 4). No significant difference was found
for the deception comprehension task for the 3 age groups
[Fisher Exact Test = 1.10, p = n.s.] (see Table 5).
Regarding the second aim, the comparison between
“appearance-reality task” and all the false-belief tasks showed
a significant positive association between “appearance-reality
task” and all the false-belief tasks; that is performance signif-
icantly improved with participant age. The unique difference
pointed out by the statistical analysis was that, regarding
appearance/reality task, the increase of the comprehension
was already localized between the 3- and 4-year-old children,
whereas comprehension/performance for the false-belief task
increased between 3- and 5-year-old children.
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with pictures Smarties test 1 Smarties test 2
Fisher’s Exact
Test
3 years Absent 18 (−1.9) 26 (2.0) 22 (.6) 20 (−1.0) 23 (.3) 7.28
Present 13 (1.9) 4 (−2.0) 7 (−.6) 11 (1.0) 8 (−.3)
4 years Absent 1 (−2.8) 11 (1.4) 13 (2.2) 8 (−.1) 6 (−1.1) 13.46∗∗
Present 13 (2.8) 9 (−1.4) 8 (−2.2) 12 (.1) 14 (1.1)
5 years Absent 0 (−2.8) 11 (2.7) 8 (1.4) 5 (−.2) 3 (−1.3) 16.45∗∗
Present 27 (2.8) 19 (−2.7) 20 (−1.4) 23 (.2) 25 (−1.3)
Note.The frequencies and the residuals reported in bold type are significant. Standardized adjusted residuals are bracketed. ∗∗𝑝 < .01 and ∗∗∗𝑝 < .001.
Table 5: Statistical association between “deception comprehension task” and participant: Fisher’s Exact Test.
Task Comprehension 3 years 4 years 5 years Fisher’s Exact Test
Deception comprehension task Absent 6 (1.0) 11 (.5) 18 (−1.2) 1.10
Present 0 (−1.0) 1 (−.5) 4 (1.2)
Note. Standardized adjusted residuals are reported in brackets.
9. Discussion
This study aimed to highlight the different levels of perfor-
mance in 3-, 4-, and 5-year-old children in an appearance-
reality task. Findings revealed a first key aspect that, beyond a
significant increase in performance at the appearance-reality
task, 4-year-old children’s performances reflect a still implicit
awareness, as none of them, and even among children of five
years, explicitly said “the milk seems red but actually it is
white,” confirming the findings of other studies [14, 30, 34].
Our first hypothesis was confirmed, since children’s answers
are distributed in a significantly different way in relation to
age: there is a tendency for which the wrong answers, partic-
ularly high at 3 years, greatly decrease towards 4 years. At 5
years, there is a tendency for answers that indicate the pres-
ence of appearance-reality distinction understanding. These
results support the hypothesis that in preschool children a
substantial improvement in performance is found between 3
and 5 years. 3-year-old children failing in appearance-reality
distinction show a similar pattern of answers defined by [14]
as “phenomenism error” and “intellectual realism error.” In
the first case, children answer both questions only in terms
of appearance “the milk in the glass appears red and is red.”
Instead, in the second case, they answered only in terms of
reality “milk is white and appears white.”These arrangements
bring out the difficulty of a younger child to pay attention to
both aspects simultaneously. Specifically, in our sample, the
majority of 3-year-old participants produce “phenomenism”
bias. For this purpose, it is important to consider that the test
used, focusing on the characteristic of an object (the color),
promotes the tendency to pay attention to the perceptually
most salient aspect, appearance [45]. Only three children
produced “intellectual realism” bias: they answered both
questions in terms of reality, a trend that generally prevails
in evidence concerning the identity, and not the perceptual
ownership such as in this case, of an object [46]. Briefly,
the results lead us to hypothesize that younger children
have difficulty in mentally manipulating two conflicting
representations and they try to resolve this by focusing only
on themost salient aspect. Regarding the sample of 5-year-old
children, despite all of them having answered both questions
correctly, succeeding in distinguishing appearance (red) from
reality (white), none of them produced terms like “seems”
or “looks like” to clarify their understanding. The answers
that emerged to the question on appearance are as follows:
our subjects respond to the question on appearance “it is
red,” and never “seems red,” as well as the next question
on reality, “it is white.” The expression “seems” is rarely
indeed used by children of this age; however, there was a
spontaneous use of words like “actually” and “truly” [47].
So, we could summarize by saying that 5-year-old children,
although doing well in the tests, still tend to analyze objects
and situations sequentially, considering appearance as a
reality in a given moment. It is clear that these children have
not yet fully acquired the reversibility of thought [33], but
they have the basic skills to develop a more structured and
conscious ability to distinguish and simultaneously manage
all possible representations of an object or an event, with
all the implications that this entails. The ability to consider
and manage different representations, on the other hand,
concerns not only recognition of the distinction between
appearance and reality, but also the recognition of false belief.
So, they show their understanding, but at the same time
they are not able to fully master and simultaneously manage
both conflicting representations. Referring to Wellman and
Liu [48] we might think that children have an implicit
understanding of the difference between appearance and
reality, but they are unable to explain their understanding
with the expression: “the milk in the glass seems red, but it is
white.” However, the hypothesis that the difficulty of younger
children is due to cognitive immaturity in the management
of the double representation would be called into question
because, observing spontaneous behavior in different familiar
contexts, children show that they act as if they have real-
apparent level in mind regarding the characteristics of the
object or situation they encounter [49].
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Table 6: M and ds of the deception comprehension task in narrative
story and level of textual competence.
3 years 4 years 5 years
M (ds) M (ds) M (ds)
Structure 1.3 (0.5) 2.3 (1) 2.8 (1)
Coherence 0.2 (0.4) 1 (1) 1.4 (0.9)
Cohesion 1 (0) 1.1 (0.3) 1.3 (0.6)
The second purpose of the study was to investigate the
relationship between AR performances and FB performances
(unexpected location, deceptive content, and deception com-
prehension tasks performances). Results partially confirmed
our hypotheses. An improvement between 3 and 5 years
across all the tests emerged, but only children at 4 and 5
years show that they master AR distinction understanding
better than FB comprehension in the other tests. These
results seem in line with another finding (see [29, 36]) that
highlights developmental lags between FB and AR task. In
particular, our results overlap with the developmental pat-
terns expressed by the majority of children (75%), according
to which AR tasks are performed with more success than FB
tasks. However, we must consider that the result informs us
about an early onset of appearance and reality distinction
understanding; in fact, no 5-year-old child spontaneously
says “the milk in the glass seems red, but it is white.” If
we had considered this answer, no one had a good test
result. Regarding 3-year-old children, comparison between
AR tasks and FB tasks shows a similar pattern of answers,
in line with [28, 29]: those who correctly respond to the
AR task also do so in FB task, and, on the contrary, those
who fail tend to fail even in the others. In contrast to our
assumptions, the results obtained with the two forms of FB
task “Sally and Ann” [39] with puppets and with pictures,
while showing a clear progression with age, do not show
any performance difference between the two forms. The
introduction of more familiar and interesting materials does
not facilitate performance of younger children on the test,
leading to hypotheses that the task is beyond the reach of the
general cognitive level of young children.
Finally, we have to underline that nearly half of the
participants did not want to tell the story after hearing it
from the researcher. Most were children of 3 years. On the
other hand, although the majority of 5-year-old children
were able to tell the story proposed by the investigator, very
few understood the deception in the narrative. 3-year-old
children produced, on average, “nonstories,” while 4- and 5-
year-old children produced, on average, “sketch stories” (see
Tables 1 and 6). This progression is in line with literature
where an improvement in the ability to tell and retell stories
between 3 and 5 years is highlighted [50, 51]. Beyondnarrative
competence, results showed no improvement in performance
in the deception understanding task nor from 3 to 5 years
old. This finding leads us to suppose that all children have,
likewise, encountered significant difficulty with this kind of
task. We might think that the difficulty of one test added to
that of the other, making comprehension of the deception
task too hard even for 5-year-old children. According to
Siegal [52], in addition, some elements of the procedures
used in standard tests, such as the type of questions, the
kind of objects used, and the method of the tasks, might
contribute to the difficulties shown in their conduct by
younger children [47]. On the other hand, they also suggest
that the difficulties arising for younger children may be due
to the use, in all standard tests of verbal response mode.
To explain these reactions, it may be useful to refer to the
distinction between implicit and explicit understanding of
theory of mind proposed by [53]. In line with this, the child
senses that the other has a false belief and proves it implicitly;
however, he/she shows difficulty in explaining this intuition,
giving the wrong answer to the question on the false belief.
The importance of theory of mind is central in child
development for its relevance to comprehension of the
surroundingworld. In particular, understanding of the differ-
ence between appearance and reality represents an important
acquisition and so a useful role for the child’s future learning.
The results obtained in this work might suggest that, in
this transition period, ranging from 3 to 5 years, the school
may operate in the “proximal development zone” [54] for
children. One of the fields that lends itself to stimulate
the understanding of appearance and reality is scientific
learning, such as in subjects like biology and chemistry [55].
With this study, it was shown how 3-year-old children have
difficulty in mastering two conflicting representations. The
proposal to introduce science topics at school for children
aiming to promote the development of a scientific “thinking”
cannot be achieved by showing such small children only
picture books containing experiments, natural phenomena,
and expecting to teach scientific concepts such as chemistry
or physics. At this age in fact children have not yet mastered
a decentralized and reversible thought, necessary for the
formation of scientific concepts and the construction and
reconstruction of knowledge about the world, both physical
and social [56]. Science learning in kindergarten can also
have moments of observation of natural situations, where
children spontaneously grasp the understanding of the dif-
ference between appearance and reality.
Future research could consider systematic observations
on a larger sample in natural situations, as close as possible
to a real-life situation or practice detections in spontaneous
life conversations and in particular in natural situations of
exploration of nature. A further limitation is that this study
used only a single measure for AR distinction understanding,
so future research should submit different groups of children
to different AR tasks or they could set up a task that is
impermeable to children’s learning of the answers to the tests.
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